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Burton: Insolvency Proceedings in Asia

AN OVERVIEW OF INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS IN ASIA
LESLIE BURTON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Asia is characterized by the diversity of its laws, customs, culture, and
history. 1 Certainly this holds true for its bankruptcy laws.
This paper gives an overview of current bankruptcy (insolvency)
proceedings in Asia. It will explain the existing laws, which are
generally old and too outmoded to resolve modem cross-border
debtor/creditor disputes. It will explore cultural attitudes which have
both inhibited use of the existing laws and prevented meaningful changes
to them. It will discuss how the changing structure of the market makes
bankruptcy proceedings more common today than in the past, and
appears to be leading many countries to revamp their bankruptcy laws.
This paper will focus on the bankruptcy laws of eight Asian countries:
Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
and Japan.
II.

BACKGROUND

When a company is in financial trouble, especially severe financial
trouble, its remedies depend upon the law of the jurisdiction in which it

* Lecturer, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California. SA, magna
cum laude, University of Portland (1976); JD, cum laude, Santa Clara Law School (1979). She is
presently pursuing her LL.M. in International Legal Studies at Golden Gate University. She wishes
to thank Kristine Ogilvie for her kind assistance with researching this article.
I. Simon Walker, Asian Insolvency Regimes Feel Strain, THE NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1998, at C3.
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(or its assets) are located. All Asian countries (indeed, most countries in
the world) allow a liquidating bankruptcy proceeding, in which the
debtor company's assets are sold and the proceeds are distributed on an
equitable basis among its creditors. The debtor is then out of business.
The laws vary, however, in many ways, such as who is eligible to file,
how the debtor and its creditors are treated, and how the laws are
perceived culturally.
Some countries also allow reorganization proceedings, a relatively
modem concept pursuant to which the debtor remains in business, and is
"rescued" by restructuring its debts or asset base, or taking other steps
necessary to allow it to remain operating and yet still reach a satisfactory
arrangement with its creditors. Reorganization is the best option if the
company retains value as a going concern. Until very recently, however,
reorganization proceedings have not been authorized in Asian countries.
In the past decade they have started to be authorized, and indeed are
coming into common use some countries. As reorganizations become
more common, they are more accepted.
This paper will discuss the laws and culture of each of the eight countries
in tum.
A.

HONG KONG

Among the Asian countries, Hong Kong has one of the most recent
bankruptcy laws, which were substantially amended in 1984. 2 Ironically,'
Hong Kong's model for the 1984 amendments was old United Kingdom
law from 1948, which was no longer the law in the U.K. by the time
Hong Kong emulated it. 3 Historically, the United Kingdom's laws have
been notoriously pro-creditor.4 Thus Hong Kong's laws remain archaic
and harsh. As one practitioner put it, "[T]he purpose of the law is to kill
the company so that the creditor gets the best deal.,,5 The proceeding for
the insolvency of an individual is called bankruptcy, and the proceeding
for the insolvency of a company is called "winding Up.,,6 Both are

2. China and Thailand have the newest bankruptcy laws. China's were enacted in 1996, and
Thailand's in 1998. They are discussed infra.
3. Roman Tomasic, et aI., Insolvency Law Administration and Culture in Six Asian Legal
Systems, 6 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. LAw 248, 255 (1996).
4. Walker, supra note 1.
5. Tomasic, supra note 3, at 256.
6. Charles Booth, Living in Uncertain Times: The Need to Strengthen Hong Kong Transnational Law, 34 COL. J. OF TRANSNAT'L LAw 389, 391 n.1 (1996).
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liquidation proceedings. Hong Kong does not have any formal "rescue"
system (reorganization or restructuring). 7
Proposals for introducing a rescue system are pending. In 1995 the Law
Reform Commission of Hong Kong established a Subcommittee on
Insolvency to study and discuss new provisions to rescue its insolvent
companies. s The Commission proposed amending the bankruptcy laws
to allow a type of corporate rescue (reorganization) called judicial
management. 9
Judicial management is a type of reorganization
proceeding in which a court appoints a manager for the company, whose
duty is to make agreements with creditors so that the company can avoid
liquidation.
The law has not passed because of opposition from two quarters: (1)
employee groups, who are opposed to the judicial management system
because they fear that employees will not be able to claim arrears from
the government's wage insolvency fund if the company is not liquidated,
and (2) operators of the wage insolvency fund, who fear that the fund
would be overtaxed if it had to pay claims of employees of judicially
managed companies. lO Those in favor of judicial management argue that
the judicial management system would allow businesses to stay open and
employees to keep their jobs in the long run,11 which is far better than
merely being able to make a claim against a fund.
During the. several years that the argument has been waging, many
companies have had to be liquidated because no rescue system was
available to them. 12 The committee must somehow reassure the
employees, or amend the laws to deal with their objections, so that the
judicial management proceeding can be authorized.
With regard to foreign bankruptcies, Hong Kong subscribes to the
universality approach, which means that it recognizes the extraterritorial
scope of bankruptcy proceedings. It uses common law principles to
determine whether to recognize a foreign bankruptcy proceeding. 13

7. Tomasic, supra note 3, at 255.
8. Booth, supra note 6, at 391; Tomasic, supra note 3, at 255.
9. Jo Tura, "Power-play" in Hong Kong over Corporate Rescue Law, LAw MONEY, Jan. 13,
. 1999. (available at www.lawmoney.com!public/news!hotnews/news990113.l.html). Author Tura
uses the term "provisional supervision" instead of "judicial management." For purposes of this
article, the terms are interchangeable.
10. [d.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd. v. States Steamship Co., H.K.L.R. 512, 514-21 (1979).
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Once the foreign bankruptcy is recognized, the foreign insolvency
representative is allowed title to the debtor's moveable assets located in
Hong Kong. 14 As far as nonmoveable assets (such as real property) are
concerned, the foreign representative must file a local action, typically a
receivership action, to obtain rights over that property.15
Hong Kong also allows a foreign company with assets in Hong Kong to
have its Hong Kong assets liquidated in Hong Kong as part of a Hong
Kong bankruptcy proceeding, even if the company has not filed
bankruptcy in its own country or elsewhere. To determine when this is
allowable, the Hong Kong courts use a two-part test: (1) whether a
"sufficient close connection" exists between Hong Kong and the debtor
to justify allowing a Hong Kong bankruptcy proceeding, and (2) whether
a reasonable possibility exists that the creditors will be benefited by the
liquidation of the assets that are in Hong Kong. 16 Applying this test in
1994, the court allowed a bankruptcy proceeding to be brought in Hong
Kong against a Chinese company called China Tianjin International .
Economic & Technical Co-operative Corporation (CTIETCC).17
China has become the biggest investor in Hong Kong, and as a result
there has been an increase in Chinese businesses that owe money to
Hong Kong creditors yet are unable or unwilling to pay. 18 Yet China
does not recognize Hong Kong bankruptcies. 19 Thus creditors may
increasingly use the type of "backdoor" bankruptcy used in CTIETCC to
obtain redress in Hong Kong against Chinese companies.
The insolvency situation in Hong Kong is dependent on whether China
will continue to honor the Joint Declaration and Basic Law.z° If it does,
the bankruptcy system in Hong Kong will continue in place. If not, new
laws will be promulgated and foreign investors may liquidate their Hong
Kong assets and move abroad. Further, foreign countries would be less
likely to recognize Hong Kong's bankruptcies. In the United States, for
example, Hong Kong bankruptcies are recognized now because Hong

14. Galbraith V. Grimshaw, App. Cas. 508 (Hong Kong 1910).
15. Booth, supra note 6, at 401.
16. In re China Tianjin International Economic & Technical Co-operative Corp., 2 H.K.L.R.
327,328 (1994).
17. Id.
18. Booth, supra note 6, at 439, citing Adrian Kennedy, Main/and is Biggest Investor,
EASTERN EXPRESS, Feb. 11-12,1995, at 27.
19. Booth, supra note 6, at 434.
20. These provide that Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China but will continue to have a high degree of autonomy, maintain an independ.
ent judiciary, retain its own laws, and keep its capitalist way of life for 50 years (from 1997).
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Kong is a "sister common law jurisdiction.,,21 This would not be the case
if China stops honoring the Declaration.
As far as cultural approaches to insolvency in Hong Kong,' filing
bankruptcy does not appear to have as much stigma as in many of the
other Asian countries. 22 Perhaps this is due to its having a market
economy of long standing, which may lead to a more pragmatic attitude
about risk and business failure. Although the Hong Kong community is
relatively small, it is internationally-oriented and transient, so the stigma
is not as great as in small, tightly knit communities where everyone
knows each other. In the 1980' s many bankruptcies were filed in Hong
Kong, some very high-profile, such as the Peregrine brokerage house and
the Yaohan department store,23 thus making the idea more common, and
therefore more acceptable. Nonetheless, among the Chinese population
who live in Hong Kong, the idea still has a fair amount of stigma, and it
is rare for a purely Chinese-owned business to file bankruptcy.24 Usually
the Chinese try to work out their financial problems in other ways.
B.

PEOPLE'S REpUBLIC OF CHINA (CHINA)

Early imperial China had no bankruptcy laws, because all land and
property belonged to the emperor. Legally, no concept of "private
property" existed. 25 Nonetheless, local customs developed for dealing
with debtorlcreditor problems: the debtor would divide all of his
possessions among his creditors. 26 This would not necessarily prevent
criminal sanctions from being assessed against the debtor, including
whipping. More significantly, the debt, if unpaid, would be passed from
generation to generation, thus forever condemning the debtor's
descendants to a life of indentured poverty??
China's first bankruptcy laws were enacted in 1906 by Imperial Edict of
the Qing Dynasty and drafted with the help of a Japanese, Matsuoka
Yoshi-masha. 28 The laws were heavily dependent on Japanese and

21. In re Axona In!'1 Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 B.R. 597,610 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd 115
B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991).
22. Walker, supra note I; Tomasic, supra note 3, at 269.
23. Walker, supra note 1.
24. Tomasic, supra note 3, at 269-70.
25. Stephen Baister, Efficiency versus Ideology - The Insolvency Law of the People's Republic
of China, 8 TROLLEY'S INSOLVENCY LAw & PRACTICE 166 (1993).
26. Id.
27. Id.; Tomasic, supra note 3, at 277.
28. Baister, supra note 25, at 166; Ronald Winston Hanner, Insolvency Law and Reform in the
People's Republic of China, 64 FORDHAM L.R. 2563,2567 (1996).
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European law, but were in effect for only two years before being
repealed.
In large part, local custom was still used to resolve
debtor/creditor disputes, a practice which was recognized and approved
by the Chinese Supreme Court?9
In 1934 Chiang Kai-shek's
Kuomingtang government enacted a comprehensive bankruptcy law,
which included a form of judicial management to facilitate compromise,
and gave the local Chambers of Commerce significant involvement. 30
The law lasted only 15 years. In 1949, when China became communist,
all previous "republican" laws were abolished, and virtually all private
enterprises became state-owned?'
Between 1949 and 1988, no
bankruptcy laws existed for reasons similar to those of imperial times:
the enterprises were all owned by the state, and the state cannot be
declared bankrupt. (Some special economic zones, such as the Shenzhen,
have their own regional and local bankruptcy laws and customs,
including their own bankruptcy courtS. 32 Special economic zones are
areas established by the government to facilitate foreign trade. These
zones have their own sets of laws that may differ from laws applicable to
the rest of China. The laws of the special economic zones are beyond the
scope of this paper.)
During the 1970's and 1980's, twenty percent of China's state-owned
enterprises were operating at a loss, and 15% of government spending
was on subsidizing the state-owned enterprises. 33
China's financial
problems largely had to do with the "triangularization" of debt.
"Triangularization" means that each state-owned enterprise owes money
to another state-owned enterprise, which in turn owes another state
owned enterprise ... and ultimately, the state bears the debt. 34 Further,
no one can enforce the debt, because all of the state-owned enterprise's
property belongs to the state. 35
China became increasingly interested in developing a modem economy,
and in taking steps to break the deadlock of triangularization. To further
this goal, one proposal was to enact modem bankruptcy laws. Debate
over the issue was intense, because bankruptcy is inherently a capitalist

29. Tomasic, supra note 3, at 257.
30. Harmer, supra note 28, at 2568.
31. Baister, supra note 25, at 166.
32. Harmer, supra note 28, at 2571; Tomasic, supra note 3, at 251-52.
33. Baister, supra note 25, at 168.
34. Harmer, supra note 28, at 2582; Tomasic, supra note 3, at 254-55; Booth, supra note 6, at
439 n.263.
35. Tomasic, supra note 3, at 254-55.
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idea, tied up with the concept of credit and market risk. Many did not
feel that a socialist state could tolerate such an idea. 36
Others, however, believed that if China were to move forward into a
market economy, then bankruptcy was a necessary corollary. They
believed that China should embrace a "socialist market economy," which
would force state-owned enterprises into the marketplace, and make
them more productive, more autonomous, and less reliant on government
support. 37 Bankruptcy was seen as a facilitator. This point of view won
out, and in 1986 China passed a law which provided for state-owned
enterprises to liquidate, reorganize, merge, and be subject to take-over. 38
Between 1986 and 1996, over 2,000 bankruptcies were reported, a figure
which is probably low,39 but only 20 of them were for state-owned
businesses.4o It is far more common for the state-owned enterprises to be
acquired by another entity than to be liquidated. 41 Part of the reason for
this is that much concern exists for the employees and what will become
of them if a company is liquidated.42 The Chinese have been raised with
the concept that the state will take care of them from "cradle to grave"
with an "iron rice bowl."43
The old concept of stigma still remains, but seems to be dependent on the
circumstances. Personal bankruptcy is much more shameful than
business bankruptcy. Business bankruptcy is increasingly seen as a
normal consequence of the risks associated with a market economy.44
But different parts of the country also have different cultural approaches.
In the Chinese courts, especially along the coast and in the special
economic zones, bankruptcy is common. In other parts, including
Beijing, it is not accepted as readily and local rules are in place which
make it somewhat more burdensome administratively to file
bankruptcy.45

36.
254-55.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

45.

Baister, supra note 25, at 167; Harmer, supra note 28, at 2574-75; Walker, supra note 1 at
Walker, supra note I, at 253-54.
Id. at 253.
Tomasic, supra note 3, at 253 n.18 and corresponding text.
[d. at 279.
[d. at 254.
Harmer, supra note 28, at 2581-82.
Tomasic, supra note 3, at 275.
/d. at 265.
[d. at 278.
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China adopts the territorial approach to bankruptcy.46 It will not
recognize other countries' bankruptcies nor provide any cross-border
assistance to foreign bankruptcy representatives.47 In a 1990 case, a
Chinese court refused to recognize a Hong Kong bankruptcy, and would
not allow the Hong Kong representative to participate in a lawsuit in
China over a breach of contract.48 The Chinese court protected its own
citizen corporation from the foreign insolvency proceeding. This will
have to change as cross-border insolvency issues will continue to arise.
The Chinese and Hong Kong governments are continuing to study these
matters}9
C.

REpUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN)

Taiwan's bankruptcl law is heavily influenced by ancient Chinese
models and values. 5 Its current laws were enacted in 1929 and 1935,
with some modifications in 1966 to allow for reorganization. 51 Local
custom, however, is allowed to prevail over the law, and does. 52 A
strong Confucian ethic prevails, which means that debtor and creditors
are to settle their disputes amicably through personal relationships; if that
fails, they will ask a third party to mediate. 53 Commonly, the local
Chamber of Commerce takes part in these mediations.54 Taiwan has a
small business community in which everyone knows everyone else, and
one's "hsin-yung" (business reputation) a loss of face; many commit
suicide rather than file bankruptcy.55
Because the laws are so archaic, the procedures are unclear and
bankruptcy may drag on because there are no strict restraints or
procedural schedules. 56 As of 1996, no successful reorganizations had
been reported. 57
Other reasons to avoid bankruptcy are that the officers of the corporation
may be prevented by law from becoming involved in other industries

46. Booth, supra note 6, at 434.
47. [d.
48. Liwan District Constr. Co. v. Euro-Arnerica China Prop. Ltd., A People's Court in Guangdong Province (Feb. 9, 1990), reprinted in 6 CHINA L. & PRAC. 27 (1990).
49. Booth, supra note 6, at 434.
50. Tomasic, supra note 3, at 256.
51. [d. at 256-57.
52. [d. at 257-58.
53. /d. at 258.
54. [d.
55. [d. at 267.
56. [d. at 268.
57. [d.
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after a corporation in which they were an officer files bankruptcy.58 The
Confucian ethic and the stigma combine to make out-of-court consensual
arrangements much more common than bankruptcies. As a result, the
laws remain archaic, but there is no internal pressure to amend the
existing bankruptcy laws because they simply are not often used in
Taiwan. 59
D.

INDONESIA

Indonesia's bankruptcy laws were enacted in 1906 by the ruling
government, the Netherlands, and are based on the bankruptcy laws of
the Netherlands. 60 The laws were adopted by Indonesia when it gained
independence in 1945.61 The laws as adopted, however, applied only to
Europeans and "Foreign Orientals" (i.e., Chinese) residing in Indonesia,
not to native Indonesians.62 The 1906 law remains as the only
bankruptcy law in Indonesia today. 63 The local Chinese, because of loss
of face and other cultural reasons discussed infra, avoid using the
bankruptcy laws. Because of that, and because they do not apply to
native Indonesians, the laws are rarely used.64 In fact, in the ten years
between 1984 and1994 only 13 bankruptcies were filed: nine individual
bankruptcies, and four company bankruptcies. 65
In Indonesia, creditors rarely use bankruptcy as a remedy, and
bankruptcy bears a heavy stigma. 66 Harmony is an important cultural
value there, so Indonesians avoid confrontation about problems.
Negotiation is the accepted method of handling debtor/creditor problems,
and even then references to financial problems are discreet; direct
reference is rude. 67
This is changing, however, as conditions in Indonesia change, especialils
as many business failures have occurred and the economy is collapsing. 8
So far the government has been dealing with failed businesses on a caseby-case basis, enacting laws to make mergers between banks easier, and

58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.

[d.
[d. at 269.
Tomasic, supra note 3, at 261.
Walker, supra note 1.
Tomasic, supra note 3, at 261,263.
[d.

64.

/d. at 262.

65.
66.

[d.
[d. at 262-63; Walker, supra note 1.
Tomasic, supra note 3, at 262-63.
[d.

67.
68.
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glvmg indirect assistance to failing businesses, such as management
assistance and allowing debt restructuring. 69 Indonesian businesses are
increasingly relying on foreign capital, and are entering into loan
transactions with foreign companies. 70 As one commentator said, "It is
ironic that the Southeast Asian country with perhaps the most complex
legal system, and the one most opposed to insolvency, is the very country
that needs clear insolvency proceedings most urgently.,,71 It is to be
hoped that Indonesia will consider some reform soon.
E.

MALAYSIA

Malaysia's bankruptcy laws were enacted in 1965, and revised in 1973.72
They were based on old United Kingdom laws, which, as noted, are
famous for being extremely pro-creditor and concerned with liquidating
the debtor in a way to achieve the best pay-out to the creditors. Under
these laws, receivership and liquidation are a matter of course.
During the recession in the 1980' s, and after the 1987 market crash,
some proposals were made to introduce a reorganization system to
Malaysia, but the banks opposed the idea and the law did not pass. 73 The
Chamber of Commerce, which handles many negotiations between
debtors and creditors, tried in 1992 to introduce a form of reorganization
and judicial management into the negotiation process. 74 Although formal
reorganization laws have not passed yet, it seems that Malaysia is closer
to introducing a reorganization proceeding than many other' Asian
countries: It has at least started seriously considering such a move.
The stigma perception applies in Malaysia, especially among the Chinese
population,75 but the Malays have a more pragmatic, "easy come, easy
go" attitude toward bankruptcy than the Indonesians, for example. 76
Further, to preserve public confidence in the economy, bankruptcy
filings are not publicized in Malaysia77 and it is possible to file rather
quietly, thus lessening the stigma.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

[d.
Tomasic, supra note 3, at 263.
Walker, supra note 1.
Tomasic, supra note 3, at 263.
[d. at 264.
[d. at 264-65.
[d. at 286.
[d.
[d.
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SINGAPORE

Singapore's laws are diverse, like those of Indonesia, because of its
Malay and Chinese populations. The Malay law and customs have
aspects of Islamic law. The Chinese still follow many Chinese customs.
In light of these differences, Singapore enacted a new bankruptcy law in
1965, called the Companies Act. It was based on laws of Australia,
which in tum were based on the laws of the United Kingdom.78 Part of
the goal of the 1965 law was to minimize the differences between the
Singapore and Malaysian bankruptcy laws, and to facilitate trade and
commerce between the twO. 79
In 1985, a serious crisis in the local financial market took place when
Pan-American Industries collapsed. The collapse of a public company,
followed by its going into receivership, in turn caused the closure of the
Singapore and Malaysian stock exchanges and left a lot of companies
bankrupt. 8o Criticism of the bankruptcy laws centered around the laws'
harsh pro-creditor procedures. Many felt that some of the bankruptcies
could have been avoided, and that the companies should have had the
option to reorganize. 8l
In 1987, therefore, the bankruptcy laws were amended to allow for
judicial management,82 a procedure by which companies in financial
difficulty could be reorganized with the assistance of a court-appointed
manager. The goal of the law is to rescue companies which can be
rescued. 83 The law takes a pragmatic approach and focuses on solving
problems, not just liquidating. 84
Judicial management has not been a miracle fix, though. First, as in
other parts of Asia with large Chinese populations, the stigma against
bankruptcy still exists. But the attitude seems to be easing, especially
toward business (as distinguished from individual) bankruptcy
proceedings. 85 Other laws reflect this change in attitude. At one time, a
person who was a director of a company that filed bankruptcy was
deemed unfit to serve as a director again. Now, to prevent one from

78.
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Tomasic, supra note 3, at 258-59; Walker, supra note 1.
Tomasic, supra note 3, at 258.
[d. at 259.
[d. at 259-60; Walker, supra note 1.
/d. at 260; Walker, supra note I.
Tomasic, supra note 3, at 260.
[d. at 260-61.
/d. at 271-72,283.
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acting as a director for another company, one would have to show that
the bankruptcy was that director's fault. 86 That standard may be difficult
to meet.
G.

THAILAND

Thailand has the newest bankruptcy law in Asia, with a new
reorganization law which was effective on April 10, 1998.87 The law
amends the Bankruptcy Act of 1940, which in tum derived from a
version of the United Kingdom's bankruptcy law of 1914. 88 The 1914
law provided only for liquidating bankruptcies, with a very harsh procreditor bent, and led to a state of paralysis during the current financial
crisis. 89
The new law was ten years in the making. In 1988, the Ministry of
Justice established a bankruptcy law reform committee to humanize the
. bankruptcy laws, and to handle the situation when a viable company has
gO
financial difficulties.
The committee studied the laws of the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Singapore. 91 The new law is a hybrid
of the latter two. It is basically a judicial management of the financial
restructuring of the debtor company.
It contains very specific
procedures, allows the creditors to vote on an acceptable plan, and
establishes short time frames to keep the reorganization on track. 92 The
Act is modeled more on U.S. law than on U.K. law, which is not
surprising considering that Thailand and the United States have
historically had very close relations, as exemplified by the Thai-U.S.
Amity Treaty, which for many years has granted preferential status to
U.S. investors in Thailand. 93
Fifteen cases have already been filed under the new law, including a case
involving Alphatec Electronics Public Company Ltd. (ATEC) , a major
electronics firm with debts estimated at $570 million (20 billion baht)?4

86.
87.

[d. at 272.
Wisit Wisitsora-At, New Thai Statute Blends Chapter 11 with Singapore Practices, AM.
BANKR.INST. J., March 1999, at 1.
88. Id.
89. Walker, supra note 1.
90. Wisitsora-At, supra note 88, at I, 19.
91. [d. at 19.
92. [d.
93. Walker, supra note 1.
94. Wisitsora-At, supra note 88, at 19.
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Already the Thai government has initiated some amendments to the new
bill. In early 1999, the Thai Parliament passed a law establishing a
special bankruptcy court,95 which opened on June 25, 1999. Further, the
government also plans to include measures to reduce the stigma
associated with filing bankruptcy, which is strong in Thailand,96 and to
prepare for cross-border bankruptcy cases. 97
Thailand is well in the forefront of Asian insolvency law.
H.

JAPAN

In Japan, several different statutes provide for bankruptcy filings, and
they were each borrowed from different foreign jurisdictions: some were
adopted from Germany in 1921, some from the United Kingdom in 1938,
and some from the United States in 1952.98 (Each of those three foreign
jurisdictions have remodeled their bankruptcy laws since then, but Japan
has not followed suit.)

Each time Japan enacted a new set of bankruptcy laws, it kept the old
system intact as well. It made no attempt to integrate or reconcile the
systems. 99 Thus, there are two types of liquidation proceedings and three
types of reorganization proceedings in Japan. lOO Before filing, the debtor
must study each alternative and determine which will work best for it.
The types vary in many respects, including whether a "stay" is in place to
prevent attachments of the debtor's property, and whether the creditors
must consent to the reorganization plan.
In some instances Japan will allow a debtor to remain in possession of,
and continue to operate, its own business, as in the case of an American
chapter 11 debtor. lOl Japan also allows for judicial management by a
court appointed supervisor or administrator. 102 Most commonly, though,
when the debtor is a corporation, its management is replaced by a courtappointed trustee. 103 The debtor may lawfully be deprived of some

95 The Bankruptcy Act B.E. 2483 (1940 A.D.) (amended B.E. 2541.(1998 A.D.)).
96. Walker, supra note 1.
97. Wisitsora-At, supra note 88, at 36.
98. Patrick Shea & Kaori Miyake, Insolvency-Related Reorganization Procedures in Japan:
The Four Cornerstones, 14 PAC. BASIN L.J. 243, 244-45 (1996).
99. Id. at 245.
100. Id.; Shoichi Tagashira, Intraterritorial Effect of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings: An
Analysis of "Ancillary" Proceedings in the United States and Japan, 29 TEx. L.J. 1,5 (1994).
101. Shea, supra note 98, at 257.
102. Shea, supra note 98, at 250-51, 257-58.
103. Id. at 251,257-58; Tagashira, supra note 99, at 5, 25.
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rights, and discriminated against; for example, an individual debtor may
lose his professional license. 104 The Japanese also have antipathy to the
idea of a discharge of debts, although it is allowed under the United
States' common law approach Japan adopted in 1952.
Reorganization or liquidation may also be accomplished though private
negotiation, without the necessity of a bankruptcy filing.105 These efforts
may not be effective, however, if any of the major creditors are unwilling
or uncooperative. In such instances, a formal bankruptcy proceeding is
necessary.
Japan's approach to foreign bankruptcy proceedings is extremely
territorialistic. 106 Japan will not recognize a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding or discharge. 107 Japan will, however, allow a foreigner who
is engaged in business in Japan to file a bankruptcy proceeding in
Japan. 108 And it will allow the Japanese bankruptcy representative to
take possession of the Japanese debtor's foreign assets located in a
foreign country .109
This "have your cake and eat it, too" attitude cannot continue to prevail
in an increasing atmosphere of world trade and cross-border credit
. transactions. Japan's position at first was that a treaty would be
necessary to ensure international insolvency cooperation. 110 More
recently, in the absence of any treaty, Japan has been considering a Draft
Law which would repeal the territoriality doctrine and give
extraterritorial effect to Japanese insolvency proceedings, and establish
recognition procedures for foreign bankruptcies. III
The efforts Japan is making are increasingly necessary in the modern
world. Japan's move is a step in the proper direction, but it cannot do it
alone. To achieve complete universality of bankruptcy laws, all of the
world's countries would have to cooperate, and to coordinate all of their
procedural and substantive laws. Certainly this is not a realistic prospect.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

Tagashira, supra note 99, at 25.
Shea, supra note 98, at 243 n.2, 243-44.
Tagashira, supra note 99, at7.
[d. at 8-9.
[d. at 6-7.
[d. at 8.
[d. at 7.
[d. at 10-11.
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CONCLUSION

The economic turmoil in Asia has focused attention on the antiquated
nature of many bankruptcy laws in the region. Each country has
different laws, influenced by other countries, and its own peoples'
attitudes and culture. In the past, Confucian tradition and personal
beliefs have prevented use of the bankruptcy laws, or the updating of
them. The changing nature of the Asian economy, the emerging
capitalism and entrepeneurship in Asian nations, and the economic crisis,
are causing long-held beliefs about bankruptcy to change. Further,
expanding transnational trade mandates changing bankruptcy laws to
deal with the corresponding transnational bankruptcy issues. These
changes are starting to occur in Asia. They are ambitious but not
impossible changes, and should achieve the goals of assisting businesses
and the economy.
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